| Title | Averroes’ Doctrine of Material Intellect in the Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2021 |
| Journal | mevzu |
| Volume | 5 |
| Pages | 39-66 |
| Categories | Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Intellect |
| Author(s) | Musa Duman |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Averroes was fully aware of the fact that Aristotle’s account of intellect as propounded in De Anima was incomplete. This meant that the key facet of Aristotle’s thought was fraught with gaps. Averroes made repeated attempts in his commentaries on De Anima to fill the gaps. The problem for Averroes was this: “if human beings are enmattered entities, how will anything more than sense perception be possible?” Averroes believes that finally in his Long Commentary on De Anima he has achieved a full and coherent account of thinking and understanding that centers on a new notion of the material intellect, according to which, together with the active intellect, there is also a distinct material intellect, numerically one for all human beings. The present article explores in detail this idea of material intellect. It is shown that material intellect, for Averroes, functions as the transpersonal, non-particular and non empirical subject required for the production and containment of universal meanings. The idea seems to aim at connecting consistently the embodied, sensible forms of human cognitive experience with the noetic, conceptual element of knowledge within a basically ontological account. |
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| Title | Averroismi al plurale, II. La ricezione del Commento grande al De anima di Ibn Rushd nelle Quaestiones in tertium de anima di Sigieri di Brabante |
| Type | Article |
| Language | Italian |
| Date | 2019 |
| Journal | Dianoia |
| Volume | 28 |
| Pages | 81–94 |
| Categories | Siger of Brabant, De anima |
| Author(s) | Federico Minzoni |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Siger of Brabant sketches in his Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1269) a noetic theory defending the unity of the intellect that is usually considered as a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the separateness of the material intellect as put forth in the Long Commentary on the De anima (ca. 1186). A closer look at key texts in both the Quaestiones and the Long Commentary will give us a quite different picture: while Siger works out his theory on the background of a dualistic anthropology that takes the union between the intellective soul (conceived as an hoc aliquid) and the human body to be only operational, Ibn Rušd (who develops his theory starting from strictly aristotelic epistemological premises) repeatedly stresses throughout the Long Commentary that, if man is an agent of thought, the union between the separate intellects and the thinking individual ought to be always hylomorphic. This paper aims at showing that, although Siger has often been identified as an averroist, his psychology is certainly not rushdian. |
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| Averroes (Ibn Rushd) is well-known for his controversial thesis that there is only one separate intellect for all humankind. This article provides a detailed analysis of Averroes’s Unity Argument from his Long Commentary on De Anima, which argues from unified intelligible concepts to a single transcendent intellect. I set out the Unity Argument in its textual and philosophical context, explain exactly how the argument works on a new interpretation of its infinite regress (based on Averroes’s other assumptions about the mind-dependence of universals), and offer some brief suggestions as to how it might be further evaluated in light of alternative ancient and medieval theories. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Unity Argument is Averroes’s most important philosophical argument for his distinctive view of intellect. |
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| Title | Averroes’ Doctrine of Material Intellect in the Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2021 |
| Journal | mevzu |
| Volume | 5 |
| Pages | 39-66 |
| Categories | Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Intellect |
| Author(s) | Musa Duman |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Averroes was fully aware of the fact that Aristotle’s account of intellect as propounded in De Anima was incomplete. This meant that the key facet of Aristotle’s thought was fraught with gaps. Averroes made repeated attempts in his commentaries on De Anima to fill the gaps. The problem for Averroes was this: “if human beings are enmattered entities, how will anything more than sense perception be possible?” Averroes believes that finally in his Long Commentary on De Anima he has achieved a full and coherent account of thinking and understanding that centers on a new notion of the material intellect, according to which, together with the active intellect, there is also a distinct material intellect, numerically one for all human beings. The present article explores in detail this idea of material intellect. It is shown that material intellect, for Averroes, functions as the transpersonal, non-particular and non empirical subject required for the production and containment of universal meanings. The idea seems to aim at connecting consistently the embodied, sensible forms of human cognitive experience with the noetic, conceptual element of knowledge within a basically ontological account. |
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| Averroes (Ibn Rushd) is well-known for his controversial thesis that there is only one separate intellect for all humankind. This article provides a detailed analysis of Averroes’s Unity Argument from his Long Commentary on De Anima, which argues from unified intelligible concepts to a single transcendent intellect. I set out the Unity Argument in its textual and philosophical context, explain exactly how the argument works on a new interpretation of its infinite regress (based on Averroes’s other assumptions about the mind-dependence of universals), and offer some brief suggestions as to how it might be further evaluated in light of alternative ancient and medieval theories. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Unity Argument is Averroes’s most important philosophical argument for his distinctive view of intellect. |
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| Title | Averroismi al plurale, II. La ricezione del Commento grande al De anima di Ibn Rushd nelle Quaestiones in tertium de anima di Sigieri di Brabante |
| Type | Article |
| Language | Italian |
| Date | 2019 |
| Journal | Dianoia |
| Volume | 28 |
| Pages | 81–94 |
| Categories | Siger of Brabant, De anima |
| Author(s) | Federico Minzoni |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Siger of Brabant sketches in his Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1269) a noetic theory defending the unity of the intellect that is usually considered as a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the separateness of the material intellect as put forth in the Long Commentary on the De anima (ca. 1186). A closer look at key texts in both the Quaestiones and the Long Commentary will give us a quite different picture: while Siger works out his theory on the background of a dualistic anthropology that takes the union between the intellective soul (conceived as an hoc aliquid) and the human body to be only operational, Ibn Rušd (who develops his theory starting from strictly aristotelic epistemological premises) repeatedly stresses throughout the Long Commentary that, if man is an agent of thought, the union between the separate intellects and the thinking individual ought to be always hylomorphic. This paper aims at showing that, although Siger has often been identified as an averroist, his psychology is certainly not rushdian. |
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